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INTRODUCTION
In the constitutional analysis of campaign-finance regulation, the
starting point makes all the difference. The United States Supreme
Court, in the seminal case Buckley v. Valeo,I approached its analysis
from the starting point that the individual right to free speech is absolute,
and that the First Amendment requires protection of this right at the
expense of many societal interests served by campaign-finance
regulation.2 Subsequent cases, particularly Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Government PAC and McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,4
adhered to this view, but struggled to reconcile it with the strength of the
societal interests served by campaign-finance regulation. This struggle
manifested itself in the Court's difficulty in defining the appropriate level
of scrutiny applicable to campaign contribution limits.
After the Court decided McConnell in 2003, commentators
speculated that the next campaign-finance case would finish the process
of undermining Buckley's uncompromising protection of individual free
speech.5 For that reason, they closely watched Randall v. Sorrell,6 an
* Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2008
1. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
2. See Daniel D. Polsby, Buckley v. Valeo: The Special Nature of Political
Speech, 1976 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 20 (1976).
3. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
4. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
5. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Buckley is Dead, Long Live Buckley, 153 U.
PA. L. REv. 31, 57 (2004) (arguing that the McConnell Court merely paid
disingenuous lip-service to Buckley and was actually attempting to transition away
from Buckley's anti-corruption rationale for campaign finance regulation in order to
take into account a wider variety of societal interests). But see Daniel H.
Lowenstein, BCRA and McConnell in Perspective, 3 ELEC. L.J. 272, 282 (countering
Hasen with the argument that McConnell actually strengthened Buckley).
6. 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006).
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action challenging the constitutionality of a Vermont campaign-finance
statute. On June 26, 2006, the Court issued a three-vote plurality
opinion, authored by Justice Stephen Breyer, that asserted Buckley's
continued vitality. 7 The opinion utilized Buckley's basic structure of
bifurcation of the constitutional analysis of campaign-finance regulation
into two tests: one for contribution limits and one for expenditure limits.
Within that structure, however, Justice Breyer began the process of
fundamentally changing the role of the First Amendment in campaign-
finance cases.
Justice Breyer views the First Amendment-indeed the
Constitution as a whole-as "centrally focused upon active liberty, upon
the right of individuals to participate in democratic self-government[.],,
8
In authoring the plurality opinion in Randall, Justice Breyer began from
a different starting point than did the Buckley Court. He focused on what
he sees as a goal of the First Amendment apart from the protection of
individual speech-the preservation of citizen participation in
democracy. 9  Whereas the Buckley Court took the view that only
corruption or apparent corruption could justify a restriction on individual
speech via campaign contributions, the Randall plurality went beyond
the balancing of individual free-speech rights against an interest in
preventing corruption.' 0 Justice Breyer discussed not only an individual
First Amendment right to speech and association in making campaign
contributions, but also a societal interest, embodied in the First
Amendment, in protecting the integrity of the political process. He was
thus able to use Buckley to expand First Amendment considerations in
campaign-finance regulation while still adhering to precedent, thereby
7. Id. at 2485 (characterizing Buckley as "well-established precedent").
8. STEVEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 21 (2005) (alteration added).
9. Id. at 39 (advocating "the importance of reading the First Amendment not in
isolation but as seeking to maintain a system of free expression designed to further a
basic constitutional purpose: creating and maintaining democratic decision-making
institutions").
10. Because the plurality opinion recognized other possible justifications for
campaign finance regulation beyond preventing corruption, Randall was
immediately considered good news for campaign finance reformers, despite the fact
that the Vermont law was struck down. See, e.g., Editorial, Campaign Finance
Bellwether: The Supreme Court's Vermont Ruling Seems Like a Defeat for
Reformers. In the Long Run It May Not Be, WASH. POST, July 3, 2006 at A20.
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gaining the votes of Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito,
the two newest justices on the Court.'1
In recognizing the merits of Justice Breyer's broader conception
of the First Amendment implications of campaign-finance regulation,
this Note finds the approach he takes in Randall to be unsustainable. Its
lynchpin is an amorphous reliance on "careful, precise, and independent
judicial review."' 2 This independent review does not sufficiently protect
individual rights of free expression and association. With no
accompanying rule or standard, this review is not guided by any
fundamental measure of protection for the individual. Justice Breyer
argues that the First Amendment functions primarily to protect our
democratic system of government, especially when the regulation at
issue directly implicates that system.' 3 But assurances for individuals
must be an element of that protection in every realm of legislative action,
including campaign-finance regulation.
Part I of this Note traces the Supreme Court's approach to
analyzing campaign-finance regulation over the past three decades,
beginning with Buckley. This section pays special attention to the role of
the First Amendment in the Court's campaign-finance cases, and
demonstrates how a struggle to define the appropriate level of scrutiny
cleared the way for Randall. Part II discusses Randall v. Sorrell and its
relationship to prior campaign-finance jurisprudence. Part III.A
introduces Randall as the beginning of a paradigm shift and examines
Justice Breyer's view that both the First Amendment and campaign-
finance regulation advance the goal of protecting the integrity of the
political process, and should only be seen as competing interests when
such regulation fails to serve that goal. Part III.B asks whether Justice
Breyer's approach to campaign-finance is viable, both on its own merits,
as well as in relation to the positions of the other justices on the Court.
Finally, Part III.C highlights the major difficulty with Justice Breyer's
approach: the central and unchecked role of independent judicial review.
11. John Roberts was sworn in as Chief Justice of the United States on
September 29, 2005, replacing the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist. Samuel
Alito was sworn in as Associate Justice on January 31, 2006, replacing retiring
Associate Justice Sandra Day O'Connor.
12. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
13. See generally BREYER, supra note 8.
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I. PRE-RANDALL CAMPAIGN-FINANCE JURISPRUDENCE
A. Buckley v. Valeo
The Supreme Court established its modem approach to analyzing
the constitutionality of campaign-finance regulation in Buckley v.
Valeo. 14 The opinion has been criticized, questioned, and followed with
varying degrees of faithfulness for the past thirty years.1 5 Buckley was a
per curiam decision that has been criticized as hastily decided. 16 Despite
calls to replace it,17 the Court has continued to use Buckley as the basis of
decision in campaign-finance reform cases.
14. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
15. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of
Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHi. L. REv. 413, 464
(1996) (Buckley is "one of the most castigated [opinions] in modem First
Amendment case law") (alteration added). For campaign finance regulation cases
citing Buckley, see McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 134 (2003) (upholding most
provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act but citing Buckley to strike down
expenditure limits); FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431,
441 (2001) (upholding federal limits on political parties' coordinated expenditures,
as those expenditures amounted to contributions to the candidates with whom the
parties coordinated); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386 (2000)
(upholding portion of Missouri law limiting individual campaign contributions and
striking as unconstitutional provisions of that law limiting candidate expenditures);
Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 610 (1996)
(plurality opinion) (holding that the First Amendment prohibits application of federal
limits on political-party expenditures to expenditures that parties have made
independently, without coordination with any candidate); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for
Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 259-260 (1986) (holding unconstitutional federal law
prohibiting direct corporate spending on political activity); FEC v. Nat'l
Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 491 (1985) (holding that the
section of Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act making it a criminal offense for
an independent PAC to expend more than $1,000 to further the election of candidate
receiving public financing violated the First Amendment); Cal. Medical Ass'n. v.
FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 194-195 (1981) (plurality opinion) (upholding $5,000 federal
limit on annual contributions by individuals and unincorporated associations to
multicandidate political committees).
16. Richard L. Hasen, The Untold Drafting History of Buckley v. Valeo, 2
ELEC. L.J. 241, 242 (2003).
17. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 409 (2000)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("I would overrule Buckley .... ").
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Buckley arose out of a challenge to the Federal Election
Campaign Act (FECA), which was first passed in 1971 and then
amended in 1974 to include limits on campaign contributions. 8 FECA
imposed limits on expenditures by and for candidates for federal office,
as well as on individual and group contributions to candidates, party
committees, and PACs. 19 The Court struck down the Act's expenditure
limits2° and upheld its contribution limits, 21 finding each type of
22
restriction to have different First Amendment implications.
The government presented three interests to justify FECA's
contribution and expenditure limits: (1) the prevention of corruption or
the appearance of corruption;23 (2) the equalization of the relative ability
of all citizens to affect the outcome of elections; 24 and, (3) the opening of
the political system to more candidates by controlling the cost of
25campaigns. The Court soundly rejected the second and third proffered
interests, famously declaring that "the concept that government may
restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance
the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment. 2 6
The court did recognize the corruption rationale as a potentially
27compelling reason to restrict speech, but found it insufficient to justify
FECA's expenditure limits. Expenditure limits were viewed as "heavily
burden[ing] core First Amendment expression,"28 and were found not to
18. David Schultz, Proving Political Corruption: Documenting the Evidence
Required to Sustain Campaign Finance Reform Laws, 18 REv. LITIG. 85, 91-92
(1999). FECA was originally enacted in response to the Watergate scandal and to
reported financial abuses in the 1972 Presidential campaign. Id
19. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-24.
20. Id. at 56-57.
21. Id. at 26-27.
22. Id. at 44 ("[T]he Act's expenditure limitations impose far greater restraints
on the freedom of speech and association than do its contribution limitations."
(alteration added)).
23. Id. at 25. This was advanced as the "primary interest" served by FECA.
Id.
24. Id. at 25-26.
25. Id. at 26. The second and third justifications were advanced as "ancillary
interests." Id. at 25.
26. Id. at 48-49.
27. Id. at 26.
28. Id. at 47-48 (alteration added).
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be directly related to the prevention of corruption. 29 The expenditure
limits were therefore invalidated.3°
Unlike campaign expenditures, however, the Court did not view
campaign contributions as directly analogous to free political expression
by the contributor. 31 Because "the transformation of contributions into
political debate involves speech by someone other than the
contributor, ' '32 contribution limits do not directly burden expressive
rights. Such limits do affect associational rights, but to a permissible
degree: when an individual makes a contribution subject to a statutory
limit, she still expresses her support for that candidate, and this
expression is limited only in its ability to convey the intensity of her
support.33 FECA's contribution limit was also found to be justified by
the government's asserted interest in preventing corruption or the
appearance of corruption.34  In arriving at this conclusion, the Court
asked whether the limit was so low as to "prevent candidates and
political committees from amassing the resources necessary for effective
35 36advocacy," and found that it was not.
The disparate treatment of contribution and expenditure limits is
Buckley's most lasting and controversial feature.37  It has been
disparaged for both its practical effects and its constitutional reasoning.
Justice Kennedy has criticized the Buckley dichotomy for causing
29. Id.
30. Id. at 48.
31. Id. at21.
32. Id.
33. Id. Contribution limits place only a "marginal restriction" on the
contributor's ability to speak on behalf of and associate with political candidates. Id.
34. Id. at 25-26.
35. Id. at 21. The Court declined to scrutinize the dollar amount of the
contribution limits, stating that, "'[i]f it is satisfied that some limit on contributions
is necessary, a court has no scalpel to probe, whether, say, a $2,000 ceiling might not
serve as well as $1,000. Such distinctions in degree become significant only when
they can be said to amount to differences in kind."' Id. at 30 (alteration in original)
(quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 842 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
36. Id. at 21 ("There is no indication . . . that the contribution limitations
imposed by the Act would have any dramatic adverse effect on the funding of
campaigns and political associations.") (citation omitted).
37. See, e.g., Kathleen Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30
U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 663, 666-667 (1997) (arguing that contribution and expenditure
limitations should be treated alike by the Court).
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38
distortion of the campaign-finance system. He has noted that
skyrocketing campaign expenses, in the absence of a statutory limit on
expenditures, result in an endless need for more contributions.39 Since
the amount of individual contributions is limited, candidates are forced to
find "elaborate methods of avoiding contribution limits, '40 which turns
political speech into "covert speech. 41 Justice Thomas has attacked the
constitutional foundation for the dichotomy, pointing out that just like an
expenditure, "a contribution, by amplifying the voice of the candidate,
helps to ensure the dissemination of the messages that the contributor
wishes to convey., 42  Thus, according to Justice Thomas, limits on
contributions are as unconstitutional as impinging the individual right to
free speech.
The Buckley Court was ambiguous as to the standard of review it
applied in upholding FECA's individual contribution limit. It described
the standard as "rigorous ' 43 and also stated that any campaign-finance
reform measures must be subjected to the "exacting scrutiny required by
the First Amendment., 44  The Court cited First Amendment cases
applying strict scrutiny to laws burdening associational rights, 45 but
failed to use the precise language normally invoked by a strict scrutiny
38. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 407 (2000) (Kennedy,
J., dissenting) ("Buckley, which by accepting half of what Congress did (limiting
contributions) but rejecting the other (limiting expenditures) created a misshapen
system" where supply of political money is limited but demand is unlimited, causing
politicians to seek loopholes.).
39. See id.
40. Id. at 406.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 415 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
43. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 29 (1976) ("We find that, under the rigorous
standard of review established by our prior decisions, the weighty interests served by
restricting the size of financial contributions to political candidates are sufficient to
justify the limited effect upon First Amendment freedoms caused by the $1000
contribution ceiling.").
44. Id. at 16.
45. See, e.g., id. at 25 ("In view of the fundamental nature of the right to
associate, governmental 'action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom
to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny."') (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449, 460-461 (1958)).
347
analysis.46  One commentator has observed that "[t]he decision in
Buckley may be viewed as a case in which the strictest First Amendment
review was applied . . . . The fact that contribution limitations were
upheld may simply mean that those restrictions alone were found to be
necessary to further a compelling government interest., 47  The more
common view, and the one later taken by the Court in Nixon v. Shrink
Missouri Government PAC and McConnell v. FEC, is that the Buckley
Court applied a more deferential test to contribution limits than to
expenditure limits.
48
B. Shrink Missouri and McConnell: Deference Replaces Exacting
Scrutiny
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC 49 and McConnell v.
FEdC 0 emphasized Buckley's expenditure/contribution dichotomy, which
ultimately led the Court to explicitly lower the level of scrutiny it applied
to contribution limits. 5' These cases were surprising to those who, after
Buckley, wondered "whether, as experience ... accumulates, the Court
can continue to sustain the distinction it drew in Buckley." 52  Those
skeptical of the distinction were. wrong about its staying power, but right
about the fact that the distinction "lies at the heart of the ... uncertainty
surrounding many of the constitutional issues left unresolved by
46. The Court characterized its standard of review respecting contribution
limits as "rigorous" and the government interests served by the legislation
"weighty." Id. at 29.
47. Marlene Arnold Nicholson, Political Campaign Expenditure Limitations
and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 601, 607
(1983) (alteration added).
48. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 137 (2003) (calling the standard of
review used to evaluate contribution limits in Buckley "less rigorous"). See also
William P. Marshall, The Last Best Chance for Campaign Finance Reform, 94 Nw.
U. L. REv. 335, 351-352 (2000) (asserting that the Buckley Court applied "arguably
less-than-strict-scrutiny" to contribution limits).
49. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
50. 540 U.S. 93.
51. See Lowenstein, supra note 5, at 281.
52. Brice M. Clagett and John R. Bolton, Buckley v. Valeo, Its Aftermath, and
Its Prospects: The Constitutionality of Government Restraints on Political
Campaign Financing, 29 VAND. L. REV. 1327, 1332 (1976).
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Buckley."53  While both cases purported to follow Buckley, they each
resolved Buckley's ambiguity regarding the appropriate standard of
review for contribution limits by significantly relaxing that standard.
Shrink was a challenge to a Missouri statute that set contribution
limits for campaigns at amounts ranging from $250 to $1000, based on
the specific state office sought and the number of constituents affected
by the race.54 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated the law,
citing Buckley's "strict scrutiny standard of review" 55 and holding that
"Missouri was bound to demonstrate 'that it has a compelling interest
and that the contribution limits at issue are narrowly drawn to serve that
interest.' 56 The Supreme Court, however, overturned the Eighth Circuit.
It too purported to follow Buckley, reiterating that in order to strike down
a contribution restriction, it would require a "showing that the limits
were so low as to impede the ability of candidates to 'amass the
resources necessary for effective advocacy."' 5 7  In articulating its
construction of the Buckley test, however, the Court actually set out a far
more lenient test for the constitutional validity of contribution limits:
"We asked, in other words, whether the contribution limitation was so
radical in effect as to render political association ineffective, drive the
sound of a candidate's voice below the level of notice, and render
contributions pointless. 58 As Professor Richard Hasen has noted, "[i]n
an era of faxes, web pages, and e-mails, it is hard to imagine any
contribution limit that would fail this test of constitutionality." 59 The
Court justified its clarification of the Buckley test by explaining,
"[p]recision about the relative rigor of the standard to review




54. Shrink, 528 U.S. at 382 (citing Mo. REv. STAT. § 130.032.1 (1998 Cum.
Supp.)). The amounts were indexed for inflation, to be adjusted every other year
according to the Consumer Price Index. Id. at 382-383.
55. Id. at 384 (quoting Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519, 521
(8th Cir. 1998)).
56. Id. (quoting Adams, 161 F.3d at 521).
57. Id. at 397 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976)).
58. Id. at 397 (emphasis added).
59. Richard L. Hasen, No Exit? The Roberts Court and the Future of Election
Law, 57 S.C. L. REv. 669, 675 (2006) (alteration added).
60. Shrink, 528 U.S. at 386 (alteration added).
2007]
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One commentator has offered this view of the Shrink Court's
choice of scrutiny, noting that the Missouri law should have failed under
strict scrutiny, but that consistency with Buckley pointed to upholding it:
Application of Buckley in light of the Court's usual
treatment of strict scrutiny thus presented the
Shrink Court with a dilemma-should it openly
acknowledge that Buckley meant to apply a lower
standard of scrutiny than its rhetoric indicated, or
should it acknowledge strict scrutiny as the
appropriate standard but find a way to justify
upholding the law?
6 1
The Court's struggle with this dilemma was evident when
compared to the Eighth Circuit's holding below. In its application of
what it understood to be the Buckley level of scrutiny, the appellate court
held that Missouri had not met its evidentiary burden of showing that
there were real and actual instances of corruption that justified the
62specific contribution limits that its law imposed. The Supreme Court,
however, was unconcerned with the lack of evidence to back up the law,
stating, "[t]here is little reason to doubt that sometimes large
contributions will work actual corruption of our political system, and no
reason to question the existence of a corresponding suspicion among
voters." 63  This casual approach to Missouri's evidentiary burden
stemmed from the Court's loose construction of the Buckley test. The
Court claimed that evidence of actual corruption had only been required
to support expenditure limits, but had never been required to support
contribution limits. 64 It re-emphasized the Buckley dichotomy, insisting
61. Christina E. Wells, Beyond Campaign Finance: The First Amendment
Implications of Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 66 Mo. L. REv. 141,
164 (2001).
62. Shrink, 528 U.S. at 384-385. The evidence Missouri presented was indeed
scant. It included an affidavit from a state senator saying that "large contributions
have 'the real potential to buy votes,"' newspaper articles alleging impropriety
resulting from large campaign contributions, and the passage of a voter initiative
enacting contribution limits, offered as evidence that voters perceived campaign
contributors to have undue influence on the political process. Id. at 393 (quoting
Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC v. Adams, 5 F. Supp. 2d 734, 738 (E.D. Mo. 1998)).
63. Id. at 395 (alteration added).
64. Id. at 392. The challengers cited Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm.
v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996), to support their charge that the Court had added to the
CAMPAIGN-FINANCE REG ULA TION
"[w]e have consistently held that restrictions on contributions require
less compelling justification than restrictions on independent
spending., 65 Here, the Shrink Court explicitly admitted what the Buckley
Court would not: contribution limits receive lower scrutiny than
expenditure limits. Instead of undertaking a strict balancing of the
individual First Amendment right to speak via political contributions
against the compelling governmental interest in preventing corruption,
the Court deferred to the Missouri legislature's determination of what
type of restriction was necessary to prevent corruption. Such deference
66is associated with intermediate scrutiny, not strict scrutiny.
The Court confirmed its newfound deference to legislative
determinations of the need for contribution limits in McConnell v. FEC.
6 7
In McConnell, the Court was especially deferential to Congress's
determinations in crafting the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
("BCRA") of 2002,68 known as the McCain-Feingold Act. The Court
upheld almost all the provisions of the Act, which regulated soft money,
limited corporate and political party spending on issue ads, and raised
69
FECA's limits on individual contributions. The Court once again relied
on the government's asserted interest in preventing corruption and its
70appearance. In explaining its approach to analyzing BCRA, the Court
included explicit language about legislative deference: "The less rigorous
standard of review we have applied to contribution limits (Buckley's
'closely drawn' scrutiny) shows proper deference to Congress's ability to
Buckley test a strict evidentiary requirement to show that corruption was "real, not
merely conjectural." Shrink, 528 U.S. at 392. The Court responded: "Although the
principal opinion in that case charged the Government with failure to show a real
risk of corruption, the issue in question was limits on independent expenditures by
political parties, which the principal opinion expressly distinguished from
contribution limits ... " Id. (internal citation omitted).
65. Id. at 387 (alteration added) (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc.,
479 U.S. 238, 259-60 (1986)).
66. Wells, supra note 61, at 165 ("Shrink's review of the state's evidence
reflects the phenomenon of deference associated with an untethered balancing test
like intermediate scrutiny.").
67. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
68. Pub. L. No. 107-171, 101, 116 Stat. 81, 82 (codified at 2 U.S.C.A. §
441i(a) (Supp. 2003)).
69. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 132.
70. See id. at 143.
2007]
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weigh competing constitutional interests in an area in which it enjoys
particular expertise.",
71
C. The First Amendment and Pre-Randall Campaign-Finance
Jurisprudence
The fluctuating level of scrutiny the Court has applied to
campaign-finance regulations is attributable, at least in part, to the
uncertain role of the First Amendment in these cases. The Buckley
opinion is the seed of the Court's ambiguity in this area. One
commentator has argued that "Buckley attempted to find a middle road
between two alternatives-[that of] regulating campaign-finance activity
like ordinary economic activity and that of protecting it as core First
Amendment speech.",72 Despite the tension between those alternatives,
the Buckley Court created a close link between campaign-finance and
political speech. It declared that FECA's "contribution and expenditure
limitations operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment
activities,, 73 and stressed that although a contribution is "a general
expression of support for the candidate and his views ' 74 rather than a
specific message, it is still political speech meriting First Amendment
protection.75 Highlighting the divide over this fundamental issue, Justice
White wrote in dissent that FECA's limitations on contributions and
expenditures did not control the content of political speech, either
directly or indirectly.76 Rather, he argued that the Act regulated the
giving and spending of money-acts that while having some First
77Amendment significance, are not speech themselves. The debate over
the degree to which campaign contributions are entitled to First
71. Id. at 137.
72. Allison R. Hayward, The Per Curium Opinion of Steel: Buckley v. Valeo
as Superprecedent? Clues from Wisconsin and Vermont, CATO Sup. CT. REv., 2005-
2006, at 195, 216 (alteration added).
73. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976).
74. Id. at 21.
75. Id. at 16 ("[T]his Court has never suggested that the dependence of a
communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech
element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment."
(alteration added)).
76. Id. at 260 (White, J., dissenting).
77. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
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Amendment protection as individual speech continued on the Shrink
Court, as demonstrated by concurring and dissenting opinions by Justices
Stevens and Thomas. Justice Stevens asserted, "[m]oney is property; it
is not speech. ' '78  He characterized campaign contributions and
expenditures as "speech by proxy, 79 stating that there are property rights
affected by campaign-finance regulation that merit "significant
constitutional protection. These property rights, however, are not
entitled to the same protection as the right to say what one pleases.,
80
Justice Thomas, on the other side of the spectrum, saw political
contributions as political speech entitled to full First Amendment
protection. In his view, "contributions to political campaigns generate
essential political speech. And contribution caps, which place a direct
and substantial limit on core speech, should be met with the utmost
skepticism and should receive the strictest scrutiny."'
'
Although the justices in Buckley, Shrink, and McConnell
disagreed about the location of political contributions on the spectrum
between property and "essential political speech, '8 2 the Court always
kept at the center of its analysis the question of the degree to which
contributions are protected as political speech. It also consistently held
that there existed only one compelling interest to justify campaign-
finance regulation-the prevention of corruption or apparent corruption.
Though it afforded legislatures more leeway to determine the best
method of preventing corruption via contribution limits, the Court would
not recognize another compelling purpose advanced by champions of
campaign-finance regulation: creating equality in the political
marketplace. The Buckley Court soundly rejected this interest, declaring
that "the concept that government may restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is
wholly foreign to the First Amendment., 83  The individual First
Amendment right to free speech and society's interest in equalizing the
78. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 398 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (alteration added).
79. Id. at 399 (Stevens, J., concurring).
80. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 412 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
82. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
83. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976). See supra text accompanying
notes 23-30.
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political marketplace were seen as completely at odds with each other,
and the only legitimate question was how much protection contribution
limits-as individual speech--deserved. The Buckley Court explained
the primacy of individual over societal interests under the First
Amendment:
The First Amendment denies government the
power to determine that spending to promote one's
political views is wasteful, excessive, or unwise. In
the free society ordained by our Constitution it is
not the government, but the people individually as
citizens and candidates and collectively as
associations and political committees who must
retain control over the quantity and range of debate
84on public issues in a political campaign.
Randall v. Sorrell began to change this conception of the First
Amendment. In crafting the plurality opinion, Justice Breyer attempts to
lead the Court toward a recognition of marketplace correction as an
interest that is not at odds with the First Amendment, but rather, serves
the same goals as the First Amendment itself. Under the new conception
that Justice Breyer advances, the societal need for campaign-finance
regulation does not need to overcome the individual right to free speech
in order for such regulation to be constitutional-individual speech rights
and the creation of a functional, democratic political marketplace are
both protected under the First Amendment.
II. RANDALL V. SORRELL
It was against the backdrop of Buckley, Shrink, and McConnell
that Randall v. Sorrel 85 came down in June 2006. Randall was a
86constitutional challenge to Act 64, Vermont's Campaign Finance
Reform Act. Because the Supreme Court had applied Buckley's
contribution limits test in an increasingly relaxed manner in Shrink and
McConnell, there was speculation among Court-watchers that the Court
would accept political equality (as opposed to solely the prevention of
84. Id. at 57.
85. 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006).
86. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2801 et seq. (2002).
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corruption) as a compelling interest to justify campaign-finance
regulation.87  It was projected that the Buckley dichotomy between
contribution and expenditure limits would be overruled in the process,
opening the door for constitutionally compliant expenditure limits.88 As
it were, the case yielded a badly splintered decision. The controlling
plurality opinion was written by Justice Breyer and joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito. In total, six different opinions were
written. 89 The plurality purported to adhere faithfully to the Buckley
framework, though its reasoning did not follow the precedential
trajectory toward greater legislative deference on the question of
contribution limits. Instead, Justice Breyer crafted a new standard of
constitutional review consistent with his view of the First Amendment as
a guardian of the "integrity of our electoral process." 90
Act 64 imposed mandatory expenditure limits on candidates for
state office for an entire two-year general election cycle.9 1  It also
imposed contribution limits, which were not indexed for inflation.
Individuals and political parties and committees were subject to the same
limits: $400 for candidates for governor, lieutenant governor and other
statewide offices; $300 for candidates for state senator; and $200 for
87. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Shrink Missouri, Campaign Finance, and
"The Thing That Wouldn't Leave," 17 CONST. COMMENT. 483, 485 (2000)
(suggesting that, after Shrink, the Court was "preparing to erect in place of Buckley a
jurisprudence more hospitable to campaign finance regulation, possibly by accepting
the equality rationale").
88. Id.
89. See Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2500 (Alito, J., concurring) (stating that
respondents' plea to "revisit Buckley" was not properly presented); id at 2501
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (criticizing Buckley for leading to the
creation of entities such as PACs, which operate out of sight of the ordinary citizen);
id. at 2502 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The illegitimacy of Buckley is
further underscored by the continuing inability of the Court... to apply Buckley in a
coherent and principled fashion."); id. at 2509 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that
expenditure limits are constitutional and serve compelling governmental interests in
reducing candidates' fundraising time and "protect[ing] the political process from
undue influence of large aggregations of capital" (alteration added) (citation
omitted)); id. at 2511 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that "the contribution limits
satisfy controlling precedent").
90. Id. at 2492 (citation omitted).
91. Id. at 2486. The expenditure limits were adjusted for inflation. They
included "spending by political parties or committees that is coordinated with the
campaign and benefits the candidate." Id. (quoting § 2809(b)).
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candidates for state representative. Additionally, the Act limited
individual contributions to political parties to $2,000 per election cycle.93
Act 64 defined "contribution" to include any expenditure made on a
candidate's behalf if it was "intentionally facilitated by, solicited by or
approved by" the candidate. 94 The Court interpreted this provision to
include expenses incurred by volunteers.95  Exceptions to the
contribution limits included contributions by the candidate and the
candidate's family, direct volunteer services, and the cost of a meet-and-
greet function up to $100.
96
The plurality struck down both the expenditure limits and
contribution limits. In holding the expenditure limits unconstitutional,
the plurality cited Buckley as controlling precedent for the proposition
that "expenditure limits violate the First Amendment," and added little
independent analysis of the particular limits at issue in the case.97 In
striking down the contribution limits, the Randall plurality
acknowledged that under Buckley, contribution limits had generally been
upheld.98 However, the plurality distinguished the contribution limits in
Randall, finding that these particular limits were so low as to "generate
suspicion that they are not closely drawn."'99 Justice Breyer identified
several "danger signs"' 00 giving rise to this "suspicion." To begin, the
Vermont contribution limits were lower than those upheld in Buckley, l0'
and were also lower than those upheld in Shrink.'0 2 In fact, they were the
92. Id. (citing § 2805(a)).
93. Id. (citing § 2805(a)).
94. Id. at 2486-87 (quoting §§ 2809(a), (c)).
95. Id. at 2498.
96. Id. at 2487.
97. Id. at 2485 ("Well-established precedent makes clear that the expenditure
limits violate the First Amendment." (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 54-58
(1976))). Later in the plurality opinion, Justice Breyer asserted that "Buckley has
promoted considerable reliance .... Overruling Buckley now would dramatically
undermine this reliance on our settled precedent." Id. at 2490.
98. Id. at 2491.
99. Id. at 2492-93.
100. Id. at 2492.
101. The statute in Buckley limited individual contributions to no more than
$1,000 to a single candidate, per election cycle. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 13.
102. The statute upheld in Shrink limited individual contributions to $1,075
and adjusted for inflation every two years. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528
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lowest imposed by any state in the nation.10 3 Further, the limits applied
to an entire election cycle, including the primary and general election,
and subjected political parties to the same contribution limits as
individuals. 104  Justice Breyer wrote that these elements created a
"danger" that Act 64's contribution limits were so low as to actually
"prove an obstacle to the very electoral fairness [they sought] to
promote."10 5
After finding these danger signs, the plurality undertook a
legitimate tailoring analysis and identified five factors leading it to
conclude that the contribution limits were not "closely drawn to meet
[the Act's] objectives."'10 6  These five factors included: (1) the
contribution limits "significantly restrict[ed] the amount of funding
available for challengers to run competitive campaigns"; 10 7 (2) the Act
subjected political parties to the same low limits as individuals; 10 8 (3) the
Act counted expenses made by volunteers toward their contribution limit,
"imped[ing] a campaign's ability effectively to use volunteers, thereby
making it more difficult for individuals to associate in this way";' °9 (4)
the limits were not adjusted for inflation and could not be adequately
monitored and adjusted by legislators; 10 and (5) the record did not
contain any special justification for such low and restrictive limits."'
U.S. 377, 383-384 (2000). In 2006, the limit was $1,275. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at
2494.
103. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2493.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2492 (alteration added). What Justice Breyer meant by "electoral
fairness" is not readily apparent. However, in the context of the opinion as a whole,
which went on to discuss the competitiveness of elections, see id. at 2495-96, it
seems that Justice Breyer was acknowledging that fairness-as the rationale for Act
64-meant more than merely the absence of corruption.
106. Id. at 2495 (alteration added).
107. Id. (alteration added).
108. Id. at 2496.
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III. RANDALL V. SORRELL AS THE BEGINNING OF A PARADIGM SHIFT
Randall's five-factor "closely drawn" test represents Justice
Breyer's attempt to base the Randall opinion on Buckley and its progeny.
The section of the opinion dealing with harm to associational rights," 2
though distinguishing Buckley, anchors Randall in the Buckley realm by
its close analysis of the extent to which Act 64 infringed individual
speech rights. It also demonstrates that protection of individual rights is
part of the protection of the integrity of the political process, thereby
providing Justice Breyer with a bridge between Buckley's focus on
individual rights and Randall's overarching concern with societal
interests.
Act 64 subjected political parties to the very same contribution
limits as individuals, counting every expenditure by a party on behalf of
a candidate as a contribution, as long as it was facilitated, solicited, or
approved by the candidate's campaign. 1 3 Additionally, the Act included
in the definition of "contribution" campaigning expenses incurred by
volunteers. 14 The plurality found that the effect of these restrictions was
to hinder the ability of individuals to associate politically, and that
therefore the limits were "different in kind" from those upheld in
Buckley." 5 The plurality illustrated several ways these features of the
Act functioned to unduly restrict political activity. 116 It pointed out that
the treatment of political parties made it very difficult for a party to act as
an enabling mechanism for individuals wishing to participate in politics
on the party level rather than the individual level.'1 7 For example, a
number of individuals could each give a small amount to their party, but
the party was not allowed to spend that money on a particular candidate
engaged in an expensive campaign. 1
The plurality applied a high evidentiary standard to the state of
Vermont to prove that the contribution restrictions were "closely
112. See Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2496-2499.
113. Id. at 2496 (citing VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 17, §§ 2809(a), (c) (2002)).
114. Id. at 2498.
115. Id. at 2499.
116. See, e.g., id. at 2498-99 (pointing out that a volunteer could exceed the
limit by making a few trips, hosting a party, or buying more than 500 stamps).




drawn."' 9  While the plurality opinion successfully distinguished
Buckley in striking down Act 64's contribution limits, its careful
evaluation of the evidence presented and its emphasis on the
inconsistencies and gaps in the evidence stands in stark contrast to the
low evidentiary requirement in Shrink.12  The plurality's movement
away from the legislative deference in Shrink and McConnell re-
establishes (as did Buckley) that there are individual First Amendment
consequences of campaign-finance regulation that must be examined
closely. Even when there are important societal interests at play,
individual free speech rights are entitled to some degree of protection.
The difference from the past cases, however, is that here individual free
speech protection is a part of the First Amendment's broader goal of
facilitating democratic participation. As Justice Breyer pointed out, the
plurality invalidated Vermont's contribution limits not because they
overvalued a societal interest at the expense of individual rights, but
because they "prove[d] an obstacle to the very electoral fairness [they
sought] to promote."'
121
A. Divining Justice Breyer's Approach to Randall
Justice Breyer's "danger signs" test 122 is the most explicit signal
in the Randall opinion of his understanding of the role of the First
Amendment in campaign-finance regulation. While Justice Breyer uses
the Buckley framework to analyze Act 64, he works to distance his
analysis from Buckley's close connection between campaign
contributions and individual free speech rights. Instead, his focus is on
the integrity of the political process. As Justice Thomas points out in his
concurring opinion in Randall, the five factors Justice Breyer considered
in his tailoring analysis 123 do not actually bear much relation to whether
the Act was "closely drawn" to effect its anti-corruption objective, 124 but
119. Id. at 2494-95.
120. See Richard L. Hasen, Rethinking the Unconstitutionality of Contribution
and Expenditure Limits in Ballot Measure Campaigns, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 885, 919
(2005).
121. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2492 (alterations added).
122. See supra text accompanying notes 96-103.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 104-09.
124. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2504 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
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rather focus on the promotion of "electoral fairness. 1 25 Justice Breyer
imputes his own view of the purpose of campaign-finance regulation to
Vermont's enactment of Act 64, thereby re-framing on his own terms the
grounds on which such regulation should be analyzed. Justice Breyer's
earlier writings shed light on his approach to Randall:
[The First Amendment] helps to maintain a form of
government open to participation....
[C]ampaign finance laws also seek to further
[that] objective. They hope to democratize the
influence that money can bring to bear upon the
electoral process, thereby building public
confidence in that process, broadening the base of a
candidate's meaningful financial support, and
encouraging greater public participation. They
consequently seek to maintain the integrity of the
political process-a process that itself translates
political speech into governmental action. Seen in
this way, campaign finance laws, despite the limits
they impose, help to further the kind of open public
political discussion that the First Amendment also
seeks to encourage, not simply as an end, but also
as a means to achieve a workable democracy.
126
Justice Breyer's approach departs from the debate over whether
money is speech. For Justice Breyer, the answer to that question is not
the end of the analysis. He answers it simply: money is not speech, but it
enables speech.12 Therefore campaign contributions are "a matter of
First Amendment concern."' 28 This conclusion led Justice Breyer to
diverge from Buckley and take his analysis in a new direction. To Justice
125. See id at 2492 ("[A] statute that seeks to regulate campaign contributions
could itself prove an obstacle to the very electoral fairness it seeks to promote."
(alteration added)).
126. Stephen Breyer, Madison Lecture: Our Democratic Constitution, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 253 (2002) (alterations added).
127. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) ("On the one hand, a decision to contribute money to a campaign is a
matter of First Amendment concern-not because money is speech (it is not); but




Breyer, the proper approach in Randall was not to balance free speech
rights against anticorruption interests, as did Buckley and its progeny.
Rather, he saw the Vermont law as working toward the same ideal that
the First Amendment was designed to protect-the integrity of the
political process-and invalidated the law insofar as it went beyond its
stated purpose and acted to degrade the process rather than enhance it.
B. Legislative Deference, Independent Judicial Review, and the Problem
with Justice Breyer's Approach
Justice Breyer does not mention "participatory self-government"
in the Randall opinion; however, he has written extensively about this
principle. Examination of these materials leads to the conclusion that, in
Justice Breyer's eyes, the integrity of the political process depends on the
preservation and facilitation of participatory self-government.
In his book Active Liberty, 29 Justice Breyer promotes an
understanding of the First Amendment as "seeking primarily to
encourage the exchange of information and ideas necessary for citizens
themselves to shape that public opinion which is the final source of
government in a democratic state."'' 30  Deference to legislative
determinations regarding what measures are needed to preserve and
further the democratic state is an important element of Justice Breyer's
equation. Too strong a guarantee of individual free speech would
unreasonably limit substantive legislative choice and the ability to
regulate the political marketplace, thus "depriving the people of the
democratically necessary room to make decisions, including the leeway
to make regulatory mistakes."' 3 ' In other words, Justice Breyer
emphasizes the First Amendment role in creating a space for democratic
self-governance. In order to exchange political speech effectively,
citizens must be able to build their own forum, and in doing so, protect
the interests that they value, including electoral competitiveness and
financial equality among candidates. This view was evident in Justice
Breyer's Shrink concurrence, where he advanced the governmental
interest in protecting the integrity of the political process and proclaimed,
129. BREYER, supra note 8.
130. Id. at 47 (citation omitted).
131. Id. at 41.
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[If it were true that] Buckley denies the political
branches sufficient leeway to enact comprehensive
solutions to the problems posed by campaign
finance[,] . . . I believe the Constitution would
require us to reconsider Buckley.' 
32
In Randall, Justice Breyer used Buckley to strike down a
"comprehensive solution" to problems posed by campaign finance-a
result contrary to his apparent belief that the integrity of the political
process will improve by way of deference, self-regulation, and
experimentation. But this result may not have been altogether
unexpected. In his Shrink concurrence, Justice Breyer cautioned that
there may be instances in which deference is inappropriate. Unchecked
legislators can harm the integrity of the political process through the
same method they use to protect it: for example, by using campaign-
finance regulation to prevent successful challenges to their
incumbency.1 33 Protecting the integrity of the political process from self-
entrenching legislators is to be achieved by "careful, precise, andindeendet j icil • ,'134
independent judicial review, which Justice Breyer advocates as a
necessary corollary of legislative deference. Justice Breyer used this
independent judicial review to strike down Act 64's contribution limits in
Randall. Justice Souter, in his dissenting opinion in Randall, criticized
Justice Breyer's departure from the Shrink precedent of affording
legislative deference:
To place Vermont's contribution limits beyond the
constitutional pale, therefore, is to forget not only
the facts of Shrink, but also our own self-
admonition against second-guessing legislative
judgments about the risk of corruption to which
contribution limits have to be fitted.
135
132. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 405 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (alterations added).
133. Id. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("Where a legislature has significantly
greater institutional expertise, as, for example, in the field of election regulation, the
Court in practice defers to empirical legislative judgments-at least where that
deference does not risk such constitutional evils as, say, permitting incumbents to
insulate themselves from effective electoral challenge.").
134. Id. at 400 (Breyer, J., concurring).
135. Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2513 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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To Justice Breyer, however, the question of legislative
deference-as well as the question of the degree to which the First
Amendment should protect campaign contributions as individual
speech-is subordinate to the larger First Amendment interest of
protecting the integrity of the political process in order to achieve a more
perfect self-government.
Justice Breyer wrote in his concurring opinion in Shrink that
"this is a case where constitutionally protected interests lie on both sides
of the legal equation,"13 6 precluding the use of an "oversimplified
formula."' 37 He supported his position, and highlighted the heart of his
theoretical departure from Buckley, by attacking Buckley's sound
rejection of "the concept that government may restrict the speech of
some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
others.'38  In Shrink, he compared campaign-finance regulation to
election regulation, "where the Constitution tolerates numerous
restrictions on ballot access, limiting the political rights of some so as to
make effective the political rights of the entire electorate."' 139 Similarly,
the contribution limits at issue in Shrink were enacted for the purpose of
"seek[ing] a fairer electoral debate."' 4  In Randall, the same purpose
was undoubtedly one of Vermont's reasons for enacting Act 64. But, by
setting contribution limits at a level that was simply too low to be
constitutional, the Vermont law allowed Justice Breyer to draw the line
limiting deference at the point he deemed appropriate, while keeping
participatory self-government-the reason for affording deference in the
first place-at the center of his analysis.
The problem with Justice Breyer's approach, however, is this
very line-drawing. If the First Amendment can require restrictions on
individual speech in order to protect democracy-facilitating speech-in-
136. Shrink, 528 U.S. at 400 (Breyer, J., concurring).
137. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 93
(1949) (Frankfurther, J., concurring)).
138. Id. at 401 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
48-49 (1976)).
139. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198-
211 (1992)). See also Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended
Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1390, 1392 (1994) ("The 'one person-one vote'
rule exemplifies the commitment to political equality. Limits on campaign
expenditures are continuous with that rule.").
140. Shrink, 528 U.S. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring) (alteration added).
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the-aggregate, it is left to the courts to decide the point at which the
restriction on the individual fails to serve society's interests, and also to
determine when an individual deserves protection despite the fact that
such protection may be at odds with democratic self-governance. The
result, according to one commentator, is that:
[F]ree speech, instead of being a guarantee of some
sort which individuals enjoy as against the rest of
society, becomes just the opposite-a guarantee
that the Congress will attempt to maximize free
speech over the entire society, even if it means
silencing certain individuals and groups in order to
do it. 4 '
The solution that Justice Breyer offers to counter this threat to
individual speech rights is independent judicial review, 142 and he in fact
uses this review to conclude that Act 64 impermissibly interferes with
individual associational rights. 143 But as Professor Hasen points out,
"there is going to be enough flexibility in the Randall plurality's
["danger signs"] test that judges hearing from competing experts will
(albeit subconsciously) hear what they want to hear about how particular
campaign contribution limits are likely to affect the competitiveness of
close elections."' 144 After Randall, lower courts have little guidance as to
when deference is appropriate and when it is not. Justice Breyer's
nuanced view of the interplay of the First Amendment with the ultimate
goals of campaign-finance regulation does not translate well into a
workable framework for lower courts to follow. Each court will have to
make its own determination of the requirements of "the Constitution's
democratic objective."'' 45 And as Justice Souter points out in his Randall
dissent:
141. Polsby, supra note 2, at 12 (examining the Court's choice to give primacy
to individual free speech rights in Buckley) (alteration added).
142. In introducing his "danger signs" test, Justice Breyer wrote, "we see no
alternative to the exercise of independent judicial judgment as a statute reaches those
outer limits [of constitutionality]." Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 2492 (2006)
(alteration added).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 112-118.
144. Richard L. Hasen, The Newer Incoherence: Competition, Social Science,
and Balancing in Campaign Finance Law After Randall v. Sorrell, OHIO ST. L.J.
(forthcoming 2007) (alteration added).
145. BREYER, supra note 8, at 50.
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[T]he plurality's limit of deference is substantially
a function of suspicion that political incumbents in
the legislature set low contribution limits because
their public recognition and easy access to free
publicity will effectively augment their own
spending power beyond anything a challenger can
muster .... But this received suspicion is itself a
proper subject of suspicion. 1
46
Justice Souter's observation points out the subjective nature of
Justice Breyer's analysis. When the First Amendment is seen as
protecting individual free speech, the question the judge must answer is
more straightforward: is the individual's right to free speech unduly
burdened by the government? But under the conception of the First
Amendment as a guardian of democracy, someone has to decide what is
best for democracy. In Randall, Justice Breyer leaves this task to judges.
Before Randall came down, a critic of Justice Breyer's theory of
Active Liberty lamented, "[t]he deference to the legislature advocated by
Breyer represents a degree of trust in the legislative expertise unmatched
by either an appreciation of its potential abuse or a feasible proposal for
judicial monitoring and controls.' ' 147 But what Randall does is just the
opposite: judges will be able to use "independent judicial review"
whenever they feel it is appropriate, even if circumstances are such that
deference is appropriate.
C. Is Justice Breyer's Approach Viable?
An examination of the current positions of the other Justices on
this issue shows that Justice Breyer's approach in Randall could
potentially gain ground in the future. This is especially true if the Court
eventually overturns the Buckley framework-a proposition that has
drawn support from a number of Justices.
The approaches taken by Justices Thomas and Stevens are built
on the question of whether a campaign contribution is speech, and if so,
146. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2514 (Souter, J., dissenting) (alteration added).
147. Robert F. Bauer, Democracy as Problem Solving: Campaign Finance and
Justice Breyer's Theory of "Active Liberty, " 60 U. MIAMI L. REv. 237, 251 (2006)
(alteration added).
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what level of First Amendment protection does it merit?"' Justice
Thomas believes that both campaign expenditures and contributions are
political speech, 14 9 that the First Amendment does not tolerate limits on
such speech, 15 that Buckley should be overturned, and that the Court
should apply strict scrutiny to both expenditure and contribution limits.
152
Justice Thomas' approach is thus fundamentally at odds with Justice
Breyer's. Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas on both his Shrink and
Randall opinions, suggesting that neither justice would vote for Justice
Breyer's approach. Justice Stevens asks the same questions as does
Justice Thomas, but provides the opposite answers: "[m]oney is property;
it is not speech,"'1 53 and legislatures have the power to regulate money in
elections. 154 Because he merely asserts that political money is not
protected speech, it is unclear whether Justice Stevens would be
receptive to the idea that the First Amendment works to protect the
political marketplace as a whole. However, he may vote with Justice
Breyer to uphold contribution limits in any event, based on his view that
the Constitution does not constrain the regulation of campaign-finance.
Justice Kennedy does not see the issue in the absolute terms of
Justices Thomas and Stevens. In his dissenting opinion in Shrink, he
agreed with Justice Thomas that campaign contributions are "one of our
most essential and prevalent forms of political speech.' 55 But, he was
more concerned with what he considered to be the false dichotomy
created by Buckley, which he believes has resulted in a seriously
distorted campaign-finance system.156 Unlike Justice Thomas, Justice
148. See supra Part I.C.
149. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 412 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
150. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2505 (Thomas, J., concurring).
151. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
152. Id. at 2502 (Thomas, J., concurring).
153. Shrink, 528 U.S. at 398 (Stevens, J., concurring) (alteration added).
154. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2510 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155. Shrink, 528 U.S. at 405 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
156. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). As Daniel Polsby pointed out following
Buckley, contribution and expenditure limits can be distinguished practically, as it is
supposedly easier to corrupt with a contribution than an expenditure. However,
constitutionally, the distinction makes no sense. To the individual being regulated,
the only difference when dealing with a contribution is one extra step between the
individual and the speech. See Polsby, supra note 2 at 22-25.
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Kennedy believes that Congress may be able to devise a constitutional
scheme limiting both contribution and expenditure limits, which would
provide candidates some relief from perpetual fundraising.157 Justice
Kennedy is thus one possible vote for Justice Breyer's approach.
However, other than his disagreement with Buckley, there is nothing to
affirmatively suggest that Justice Kennedy would sign on to Justice
Breyer's First Amendment theory.
Justice Souter dissented from the plurality in Randall. In his
dissenting opinion, he asserted that Act 64's contribution limits actually
satisfied Buckley. 158  Justice Souter expressed concern over the
plurality's lack of deference to the Vermont legislature, 159 a concern that
came as no surprise, given that Justice Souter was the author of the
deferential Shrink majority opinion. It is difficult to predict whether
Justice Souter would join Justice Breyer's First Amendment theory in the
future. He does push for the consideration of compelling reasons for
campaign-finance regulation other than corruption. 16  He also never
mentions "strict" or "exacting" scrutiny, nor does he enter the "money as
speech" debate. However, in order to vote together, Justices Breyer and
Souter would first have to come to an understanding on the proper level
of legislative deference. Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Breyer's
concurrence in Shrink, but joined Justice Souter's dissent in Randall.
This demonstrates that she may agree with Justice Breyer's approach
generally, but not with its constrained application in Randall.
The positions of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito are more
difficult to determine. Both Justices joined the Randall plurality,
allowing it to control. Justice Alito, however, added a concurring
opinion in which he claimed that the possibility of overruling Buckley
had not been properly presented by the parties. 62 This may be seen as a
willingness to overrule Buckley in the future. At oral argument, Justice
157. Shrink, 528 U.S. at 410 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
158. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2511-12 (Souter, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 2514 (Souter, J., dissenting).
160. See id. at 2511-2512 (arguing for the constitutional validity of Vermont's
proffered interest in preserving candidate time).
161. See supra text accompanying note 133.
162. See Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2500 (Alito, J., concurring) ("Only as a backup
argument, an afterthought almost, do respondents make a naked plea for us to
'revisit Buckley."') (citation omitted).
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Alito may have been questioning the Buckley dichotomy when he asked
whether candidates in Vermont could run effective campaigns on Act
64's contribution limits if there were no expenditure limits. 63  This
question contrasts somewhat with a statement that Chief Justice Roberts
made at oral argument regarding the corruption rationale for campaign-
finance regulation: "If [the voters] think someone has been bought, I
assume they don't reelect the person."' 64 Justice Alito was thinking
through the mechanics of campaign-finance regulation and the effects of
disturbing only one part of a multi-faceted law, while Chief Justice
Roberts implied that the political process itself was an adequate remedy
for corruption. Based on these limited statements, it appears that Justice
Alito would consider overruling Buckley, though there is nothing to
affirmatively suggest that he would subscribe to Justice Breyer's theory.
Based on his apparent belief in the self-regulation of the political
process, it appears unlikely that Chief Justice Roberts will ever agree
with Justice Breyer in this area.
In sum, Justices Ginsburg and Stevens are the justices most
likely to vote with Justice Breyer in favor of the constitutionality of
campaign-finance reform as protecting democratic self-governance.
Justice Souter could potentially join the Breyer bloc if those justices
offer an acceptable answer to the question of when legislative deference
is appropriate. Justice Kennedy is unlikely to subscribe to Justice
Breyer's view. Justice Alito may be even less likely to join Justice
Breyer, but it is not entirely out of the question, as it probably is for
Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Roberts.
CONCLUSION
Buckley established the Supreme Court's approach to campaign-
finance regulation by asserting the primacy of the individual right to free
speech and characterizing political money as such speech. As Shrink and
McConnell demonstrated, that characterization is not entirely
appropriate. Classifying political money as protected speech has a
163. Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Randall, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (No. 04-
1528), available at http://wwwsupremecourtus.gov/oralarguments/argument-trans
cripts/04-1528.pdf.
164. Id. at 30 (alteration added).
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number of externalities. The ability of one voice to drown out others has
more serious consequences in the political marketplace than in the
broader marketplace of ideas generally. Since our Constitution creates
and preserves a democratic form of government, the pursuit of equality
in the political marketplace through campaign-finance reform should not
focus on individual opportunity, but rather on the health of our
democracy as a whole. In this context, the purpose of the First
Amendment is the facilitation of "governmental preservation of the
essential premise of democracy itself."
165
In Randall, Justice Breyer moves campaign-finance
jurisprudence toward greater recognition of this view. But, by adhering
to the Buckley framework, he does so in an indirect way. Keeping
Buckley alive-at least temporarily-allowed him to effectively sneak in
his paradigm shift under the auspices of following precedent, making
Randall a bridge between Buckley and a more democratic approach to
campaign-finance jurisprudence.
Justice Breyer's preservation of Buckley also redefines the
importance of individual free-speech rights within this new conception of
the democracy-preserving role of the First Amendment. 166 But he can
offer only "independent judicial judgment" 6 7 as protection for individual
speech rights. True difficulty will arise if and when a court upholds new
campaign-finance regulation that advances electoral fairness, but does so
in a way that, according to the judges hearing the case, does not
undermine that fairness by harming individual free-speech rights.
165. Richard H. Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118
HARv. L. REv. 28, 150 (2004) (quoting Sullivan, supra note 37, at 680).
166. See supra text accompanying notes 117-119.
167. Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2492.
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